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INNOCENCE, EVIDENCE, AND THE COURTS
MORGAN CLOUD*
INTRODUCTION
In December 2008, a group of scholars gathered to discuss three fun-
damental topics in constitutional criminal procedure: the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule, judicial procedures, and innocence.1 The topics
were selected, in part, because each is at the center of contemporary de-
bates about the nature, scope, and definition of the constitutional limits on
government efforts to catch and punish criminals. The participants in that
discussion have contributed the fourteen papers included in this symposium
issue.
As one would expect, the papers are organized here within the three
separate symposia topics. Reading the entire set of papers, however, reveals
the artificiality of treating evidence suppression, judicial processes, and
innocence as distinct analytical categories. Constitutional questions about
the admissibility of evidence, judicial processes, and innocence emerge as
what they are, different faces of the same fundamental democratic di-
lemma. Our system of constitutional criminal procedure has evolved into
a-perhaps the--essential social institution for resolving the conflicts be-
tween the fundamental need for social order and the equally compelling
demand for individual autonomy. The conflict between order and auton-
omy is at the heart of all great constitutional questions in our democracy,
including those discussed in this symposium.
Of the symposium papers, Professor Sundby's 2 expresses most di-
rectly the links among these three topics. Rather than engage in the tradi-
tional debate over the benefits and costs of exclusion, Sundby chooses to
examine the benefits generated by the judicial procedure employed to re-
solve suppression motions. He argues convincingly that the contemporary
obsession with the rule's deterrent effect obscures "one of the most impor-
* Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory University.
1. The occasion was the annual meeting of the Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum. The 2008
session was held at the Emory University School of Law.
2. Scott Sundby, Mapp v. Ohio's Unsung Hero: The Suppression Hearing As Morality Play, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 255 (2010).
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tant beneficial effects of Mapp-the educational effects of the suppression
hearing itself."'3
Motions invoking the exclusionary rule require that key institutional
actors-judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers and police officers-must
consider the nature and dimensions of the constitutional limits on searches
and seizures.4 Sundby argues that the educational experience provided by
the suppression hearing is particularly significant for police officers be-
cause it provides them with "feedback" about the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment from sources outside the law enforcement culture, and that
feedback often is tied to the officers' testimony justifying their judgments
and actions in judicial settings where the officers may be subject to cross
examination. 5
Sundby explains why alternatives to the suppression hearing, such as
civil damage suits and training conducted within police departments, are
likely to be inferior at fulfilling this educational function. Again his argu-
ments are convincing, but for purposes of this introduction, other attributes
of the article are more noteworthy. First, by focusing upon the institutional
functions served by suppression hearings, Sundby highlights the value of
examining constitutional questions in a public, judicial forum. The connec-
tion between the exclusionary rule and judicial hearings may seem self-
evident, but the value of this critique should not be underestimated for a
justice system in which the vast majority of criminal prosecutions are re-
solved by plea bargains arrived at in private negotiations and not in the
crucible of public trials. Sundby thus highlights the relationship between
two of the symposium's topics by explaining the value of resolving eviden-
tiary exclusion issues in formal judicial proceedings.6
Sundby's arguments in favor of suppression hearings also suggest sub-
tle links between these two symposium topics and the third-innocence.
Advocates on both sides of the exclusionary rule debate often deploy inno-
cence in their arguments. Opponents of the remedy routinely argue that it
benefits only guilty people; the innocent victims of searches and seizures
need suppress nothing. Exclusion's proponents counter with a general de-
terrence claim: all people, particularly the innocent, benefit when the gov-
ernment is deterred from violating the Fourth Amendment.
Sundby's critique echoes the latter argument, but its focus upon the
individual officer's analysis of the facts leads us not to a cost-benefit analy-
3. Id. at 257.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 259-260, 266-268.
6. Id. at 266.
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sis but to the constitutional text. Sundby argues that requiring police offi-
cers to justify their actions in an adversarial judicial proceeding should
influence them to consider more carefully whether the facts known to them
before they act actually justify intruding upon citizen's liberty, privacy, and
property rights. The effect may be greatest when officers contemplate ap-
plying for a judicial warrant. 7
This argument reminds us of the functions served by the probable
cause and particularity requirements found in the Warrant Clause. Together
they require that government actors possess (and can articulate) objective
facts to justify intrusions upon a people and personal property in particular
places. By demanding that government actors present such facts, the proc-
esses of the suppression hearing, like the constitution's probable cause and
particularity requirements, logically should reduce the frequency of intru-
sions upon innocent people and their property. Presumably police officers
are less likely to possess facts suggesting guilt when the suspects are inno-
cent than when they are guilty. The limits of this argument are obvious, but
it is fair to assume both that the fact-based testimony required at the sup-
pression hearing reduces the number of these intrusions and that innocent
people are the most frequent beneficiaries.
Professor Sundby's article is only one of five discussing the exclu-
sionary rule. The other four support to varying degrees the notion that the
symposium topics are linked, but of greater importance, they lend support
to the idea that a portentous change in Fourth Amendment law may be
upon us.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
Three of these authors confront directly the question of the continued
viability of the exclusionary remedy. Each responds to the possibility that a
majority of current Supreme Court justices may be prepared to jettison the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, a fixture in federal law for ninety-
five years8 and in the laws of the States for almost half a century. 9 This
possibility has been raised in two recent Supreme Court cases, Hudson v.
Michigan10 and Herring v. United States,11 and each of these authors re-
sponds differently to the possibility of a Fourth Amendment untethered
7. Id. at 267.
8. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
9. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
11. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
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from the judicial remedy that has been central to search and seizure law
since the early days of the Kennedy presidency.
Professor Clancy's provocative article "predicts the substantial elimi-
nation of Fourth Amendment litigation in the Roberts Court"'12 and offers
several reasons for this claim. These include predictions about the impact
of recent Supreme Court decisions, including Herring and Pearson v. Cal-
lahan.13 Clancy's careful analyses of these cases lend credence to his con-
clusions that we are likely to witness a reduced volume of Fourth
Amendment litigation in future years and that the demise of the exclusion-
ary rule is in fact a very real possibility.
These conclusions also follow from his critique the of the current
Court's members. Clancy argues that only Justices Stevens and Scalia
among the current justices exhibit significant interest in the Fourth
Amendment. More pointedly, he concludes that "Scalia, who seeks to elim-
inate the exclusionary rule and expand the use of qualified immunity"14
will dominate in this area of constitutional law: "When it comes to search
and seizure, it is now Scalia's Court."'15 Clancy concludes that one result is
likely to be the demise of the exclusionary rule.
In contrast, Professor Dripps acknowledges the significance of the re-
cent opinions questioning the future of the exclusionary remedy, yet none-
theless concludes that the "exclusionary rule may survive." 16 His reading of
the majority opinion in Hudson leads him to the pointed observation that it
looks like "a brief for abolition" of the exclusionary rule. 17 Nonetheless, his
extensive critique of Hudson's "over-deterrence hypothesis" leads him to
conclude that the opinion "may be less portentous than first appears."'18
Dripps subjects the hypothesis to doctrinal, normative, and formulaic
cost-benefit analyses, and reaches conclusions that must surely comfort
supporters of the exclusionary rule. He concludes that the current remedial
scheme does a "passable job," and therefore justices comfortable with the
status quo may resist disrupting this scheme. Abolishing the exclusionary
rule without strengthening other remedies would produce a radical disrup-
12. Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 191 (2010).
13. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
14. Clancy, supra note 12, at 195.
15. Id.
16. Donald Dripps, The Fourth Amendment, the Exclusionary Rule, and the Roberts Court: Nor-
mative and Empirical Dimensions of the Over-Deterrence Hypothesis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209, 235
(2010).
17. Id. at 211.
18. Id. at215.
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tion of the status quo, a result the majority of justices are likely to reject. 19
He also argues that the Justices are unlikely to reduce their power to decide
constitutional issues, as it refused to do concerning the Fifth and First
Amendments in the Rehnquist Court decisions in Dickerson20 and City of
Boerne.2 1 Abolishing the exclusionary rule, primary vehicle for constitu-
tional judicial review of Fourth Amendment issues would do just that.
Although both offer vigorous arguments in support of the exclusionary
remedy, Clancy and Dripps offer divergent predictions about its future. In
contrast, Professor Rychlak not only recognizes the possibility that the
Roberts Court might abandon exclusion, he argues strenuously for that
outcome.
22
Rychlak offers two alternatives to replace the current regime. First, he
advocates not total abolition of the suppression remedy but rather a modifi-
cation he describes as "in keeping with virtually every jurisdiction around
the world other than the United States."' 23 The first two sections of his pa-
per read like "a brief for abolition" of the "American Model" 24 of the rem-
edy, but leads him instead to a call for a more limited rule employing a
multi-factor analytical model. "Under this standard, before ruling evidence
inadmissible, the court would consider the level of the constitutional viola-
tion, the seriousness of the crime, whether the violation casts substantial
doubt on the reliability of the evidence, and whether the admission of the
evidence would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings.
'25
Despite his rejection of the "American model" of the exclusionary
rule, Rychlak recognizes weaknesses in major alternatives commonly pro-
posed by its critics, including civil damage suits. 26 He proposes instead
that, criminal contempt orders, a different type of judicial remedy, be em-
ployed to enforce Fourth Amendment rules if the exclusionary rule is
struck down by the Roberts Court.
27
I have serious doubts about the viability of this proposed remedy, and
space constraints here preclude me from engaging the issue. Regardless of
one's views on the issue, it is noteworthy that even as he criticizes the tra-
19. Id. at 234.
20. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 436-437 (2000)). See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 16,
at209-210,235,238-239.
21. City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22. Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as Direct
Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 241 (2010).
23. Id. at 241.
24. Id. at 247.
25. Id. at 241; see also id. at 247-248, n.36.
26. Id. at 248-249.
27. Id. at 249.
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ditional exclusionary rule with arguments used by its critics for at least
sixty years,28 Rychlak looks elsewhere, including international and com-
parative law, in hopes of finding effective replacements. His paper may
represent a new era in Fourth Amendment theory, one described in another
symposium paper. "It may not be a bad thing to pause to let new voices
develop with new insights, to let social and technological change occur,
and to later re-examine the ftndamental purpose of the Amendment and its
role in protecting the security of Americans. '29 Perhaps this is what those
new voices will sound like.
The final paper in this section suggests that Fourth Amendment inter-
pretive theories could differ more dramatically from the Supreme Court's
current doctrines than the changes proposed in the papers discussed above.
The text proclaims "the right of the people," language that arguably de-
scribes a collective right. The Supreme Court has long held that these rights
are personal, and may be asserted only by individual victims of unlawful
searches and seizures. 30 The Court also has rejected the idea that the Fourth
Amendment can serve as a vehicle for combating racial discrimination.
31
Professor Taslitz's article, in contrast, focuses upon minority groups,
who are disadvantaged because of their group identity, and presents argu-
ments that lead inescapably towards theories of group rights. 32 He utilizes
methods and data from various social science disciplines (political science
and cognitive psychology, for example) to support his claims that: the
Court's opinions construing the impact of state and local laws in Fourth
Amendment decision ignore the realities of such discrimination; urban
minority groups may have more influence in local than state government;
and why local clout may not reduce racially discriminatory law enforce-
ment.
His paper ostensibly is triggered by a recent Supreme Court deci-
sion,33 but his goals are not merely to dispute that decision.34 The Court's
2008 decision in Moore is "but one example among many in which the
Court either ignores issues of race and their links to class or mentions but
28. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
29. Clancy, supra note 12, at 208.
30. See, e.g., Rawlings v. United States, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Payner v. United States, 447 U.S.
727 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
31. Whrenv. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
32. Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American Poor, 85
CH.-KENT L. REv. 277 (2010).
33. Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
34. See Taslitz, supra note 32, at 311 ("1 am not limiting my argument to Moore-like legisla-
tion.").
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summarily dismisses them in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. '35 In-
stead, Taslitz would have us recognize not only that the "Amendment's
meaning can sometimes vary geographically" in our sprawling nation, but
perhaps more importantly "that Fourth Amendment doctrine can affect the
incentives for states to correct the problem."' 36 Even those who concur with
these ideas will recognize that they deviate dramatically from the limits of
current Supreme Court doctrines.37 Their value, at least in the short term,
depends upon the success of Professor Clancy's proposal that this may be a
time for considering new ideas that can lead us to re-evaluate the Amend-
ment's meaning and function in our democracy.
38
II. JUDICIAL PROCEDURES.
The articles in this section address three distinct issues: the Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses, the Eighth Amendment right to
bail, and a theory of judicial "stacking" that uses Virginia v. Moore as a
example.
In the first of these papers, Professor Bradley examines the Supreme
Court recent Confrontation Clause decisions, 39 placing particular emphasis
upon the 2009 decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.40 His doctrinal
analysis begins with Crawford,41 which overruled the Court's earlier pre-
cedents admitting hearsay statements by although the declarants were un-
available for confrontation by the defense-if those statements had
"adequate 'indicia of reliability. '42
Bradley agrees with the Court's decision to overrule Roberts, but
writes to refute the Court's distinction between "testimonial" and "nontes-
timonial" statements.43 The Crawford line of cases holds that criminal de-
fendants are entitled under the Sixth amendment to confront testimonial
statements offered in evidence against them, but that right does not apply to
nontestimonial statements. Bradley concludes that neither the constitutional
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that claims of racial discrimi-
nation must be asserted under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1065-1072 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining about the Court's efforts to impose
Fourth Amendment interpretive conformity upon the States).
38. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
39. Craig M. Bradley, Melendez-Diaz and the Right to Confrontation, 85 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 315
(2010).
40. No. 07-951 (U.S. June 25, 2009).
41. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
42. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
43. Bradley, supra note 39, at 319.
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text nor the history relied upon by the Court support this distinction. "[T]he
main problem is ... that the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction has
nothing to do with the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses against
him, '44 because the confrontation right "applies to all witnesses offered by
the prosecution to prove its case, whether as live witnesses or through hear-
say testimony."'4
5
In contrast to Bradley's relatively absolutist interpretation of the scope
of right to confront witnesses, Professors Laudan and Allen reject claims
that the Eight Amendment requires an absolute right to bail.46 They ac-
knowledge that current judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amendment
rejects such absolutism, but argue that "conventional thought about bail and
preventive detention among legal scholars embraces such a theory."' 47 They
conclude that this view is misguided, in part because it overvalues liberty
while undervaluing competing social interests, particularly the need to pro-
tect the public from dangerous criminals. In other words, the academic
"conventional wisdom" miscalculates the proper balance between auton-
omy and order.
At the normative level, Laudan and Allen accept that both sides in this
debate can make strong moral claims in support of their positions. They
favor, however, a robust regime of preventive detention and their argu-
ments provide a provocative example of how analysis of one legal topic-
the nature of the Eighth Amendment right to reasonable bail-may rest
upon our views about a different legal issue-for example, whether we can
predict an arrestee's dangerousness based on the crimes for which he is or
previously has been charged.
Laudan and Allen strive to establish empirical support for the view
that preventive detention is desirable and that no absolute right to bail ex-
ists. Here is an example. Their data show that only about fifty-five percent
of those charged with violent crimes are released on bail (the others are
denied or can not make bail). They assume that some of these people will
commit crimes during the period of pretrial release even if they are found
not guilty of the crime for which they are charge: "[M]any of those cur-
rently on bail and who will not be convicted of the crime for which they are
charged nonetheless have lengthy rap sheets containing multiple arrests and
44. Id. at 321.
45. Id. at 323.
46. Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas 1I: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
23 (2010).
47. Id. at 23.
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convictions." Therefore, we should not automatically assume that their
"months of freedom will be cost- and crime- free."48
Experience teaches that this assumption is correct; some number of
people with criminal arrests and convictions will commit crimes if released
on bail. Experience also teaches that how we calculate the proper balance
between individual autonomy and social order may dictate, and certainly
will influence, the conclusions we draw from that data (assuming that it is
correct). If we favor autonomy, we are likely to conclude that statistics
about recidivism among the large class of people with criminal records can
never predict the future conduct of any individual. Conversely, those whose
central concern is preserving social order are more likely to find that the
same combinations of data and assumptions offer persuasive support for
aggressive pretrial detention, 49 particularly for those Laudan and Allen
characterize as "serial criminals. '
50
Laudan and Allen argue that their analysis-based in part on empirical
evidence in part on their working assumptions-establishes that "serial
felons are three times more likely to commit a felony while free than are
those without a criminal record" They recommend, therefore, a policy that
would "deny bail to all serial offenders accused of a violent crime." 51
This policy surely is more palatable if one agrees with their conclusion
that a defendant arrested for a serious crime likely is guilty. They assert
with that "[t]he fact that he is arrested and charged with the crime makes it
likely that he is guilty."52 This passage is a graphic example of the links
among the symposium topics discussed above. Their conclusions about the
likely innocence or guilt of arrestees before trial (or plea) influences the
conclusions Laudan and Allen reach about the standards that should govern
a judicial proceeding-the bail hearing necessary under the Eight Amend-
ment.
Indeed, of the papers discussed so far, all but one have examined is-
sues relating to judicial proceedings and the interpretation of a specific
constitutional provision-the Fourth Amendment or a clause of the Sixth or
48. Id. at 30 n.20.
49. See, e.g., id. at 32 (assuming that "the average fugitive on the run commits two violent crimes
per year" and will be on the run for about two years, which in turn leads to the conclusion that "some
80,000 violent crimes" attributable to current bail policies).
50. See, e.g., id. at 35.
51. Id. They would, however, "grant bail to all first- and second-time offenders," but even they
would be denied bail when the state proves they likely "are a danger to the community or likely to
become fugitives." Id.
52. Id. at 40.
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Eighth amendments. Professor Milligan's paper, 53 on the other hand, ex-
plores a theory of judicial decision making applicable to any constitutional
criminal procedure dispute, although he uses a particular Fourth Amend-
ment decision to explain his theory in the context of.
Milligan calls the theory "stacking," and distinguishes it from other
models used to explain judicial voting, including theories emphasizing
judges' personal policy preferences and those touting internal and external
institutional constraints.54 Stacking theory posits that legislatures also can
constrain judicial voting by altering an "'insulated base rule' in a way that
disrupts the Justice's larger policy agenda. An 'insulated base rule' is a
Congressional policy decision that cannot, as a legal or practical matter, be
modified by the Court." 55 One readily understood example is congressional
decisions to appropriate funds.
Milligan uses Virginia v. Moore56 to illustrate this theory. He con-
cludes that the government employed an explicit "stacking" strategy by
arguing that imposing the exclusionary remedy when an arrest violated a
state law but not Fourth Amendment seizure rules 57 "'would ultimately
discourage state legislatures from enacting measures that benefit the public
at large.' 58 Milligan concludes that all nine justices not only accepted the
state's stacking argument but relied upon it in deciding the case.
59
Milligan offers an intricate explanation of why "both liberal and con-
servative justices could find value" 60 in the state's stacking argument in
order to advance their strategic goals while leaving "for another time ques-
tions regarding the legitimacy of stacking."'61 One result is that his study of
judicial behavior is not concerned with other issues, like a defendant's guilt
or innocence.
53. Luke M. Milligan, Stacking in Criminal Procedure Adjudication, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331
(2010).
54. Id. at 331-332.
55. Id. at 333.
56. 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008). See also supra note 33 and accompanying text (where Professor
Taslitz employs the same opinion for a very different analysis of legislative behavior).
57. Police officers possessing probable cause arrested Moore for a traffic violation. The arrest
violated Virginia law but not the Fourth Amendment, which permits arrests for minor offenses commit-
ted in the officers' presence. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
58. Milligan, supra note 53, at 335.
59. Id. at 335-336.
60. Id. at 338.
61. Id. at 340.
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1II. INNOCENCE.
The articles in this final section address one of two distinct problems.
The first group of articles questions the reliability of our procedures for
determining guilt and the likelihood that innocent people will be punished.
The second group explores two different remedial responses to cases in
which innocent people have been wrongly convicted. The thematic coher-
ence among the papers within each group lends itself to a combined discus-
sion.
A. Judicial Procedures and Taking Innocence Seriously.
Each of the authors in this group questions the reliability of our proce-
dures for determining guilt and innocence, but each addresses a different
problem.
Professor Loewy addresses the most global question, whether juries
take the evidentiary standard in criminal cases-beyond reasonable
doubt-seriously. 62 The connections between this rule of evidence and the
presumption of innocence are so close 63 that the question could be re-
framed: do juries take the presumption of innocence seriously when they
decide cases?
One potential source of jury error is that jurors simply may not under-
stand the meaning of reasonable doubt. Loewy concludes that this is the
case-that this reality requires that juries be instructed about the meaning
of reasonable doubt and its importance, that the instruction should be both
detailed and comprehensive, and that judges should devote care to ensuring
that instructions are adequate to guide juries in applying the correct stan-
dard.64 These are principles unlikely to generate much disagreement when
stated so abstractly. Loewy's critique of how different instructions might
produce different outcomes reminds us that in this context the stakes could
not me higher: the liberty and lives of criminal defendants may rest upon
the difference.
Professor Weaver also examines reasons that innocent people may be
wrongly convicted, but he explores this issue by looking at a particular type
of evidence--confessions-rather than the evidentiary standards juries
apply in evaluating evidence. 65 Almost by definition, only false confessions
62. Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Reasonable Doubt Seriously, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63 (2010).
63. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
64. Loewy, supra note 62, at 68-75.
65. Russell L. Weaver, Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential Paradox, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 179 (2010).
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lead to wrongful convictions, and avoiding such false statements is an es-
sential goal of the rules governing interrogations and confessions. Yet more
than a century of judicial decisions and the widespread adoption of statu-
tory and administrative rules regulating interrogation methods have not
eliminated false confessions.
Weaver offers a range of explanations for the persistence of false con-
fessions in the face of these efforts, and inevitably concludes by recogniz-
ing the difficulty of crafting mechanisms that will succeed at eliminating
false confessions and wrongful convictions. 66 There is little reason to sus-
pect that the well-established devices-like the Miranda warnings-that
have failed to eliminate all false confessions will do so in the future. Weav-
er's most hopeful proposal is that continued and expanded use of scientific
evidence, particularly DNA evidence, will act to counteract the effects of
false confessions in the cases where such evidence is available. The limita-
tions inherent in the use of DNA to establish innocence, particularly by
those seeking to overturn their criminal convictions, only confirm the obvi-
ous: false confessions and wrongful convictions of innocent people will
continue to blight our systems of criminal justice.
Which explains Professor Hoeffel's criticism of several recent Su-
preme Court decisions, including District Attorney's Office for the Third
Judicial District v. Osborne,67 where "the Roberts Court lost its grip on
wrongful convictions. ' '68 Hoeffel argues that the Court's 2009 decision in
Osborne and its earlier opinion in House v. Bell69 "show a deep-seated fear
of the power of DNA" 70 evidence to influence judicial decisions about guilt
or innocence. 71 Her concern is that the Court's recent decisions do too little
to prevent or correct wrongful convictions.
Hoeffel's criticism of the House opinion is not directed at the holding.
More than two decades after House was convicted and sentenced to die the
Supreme Court concluded that he had made "a compelling claim of actual
innocence" and therefore the "state procedural default rule is not a bar to a
federal habeas corpus petition." 72 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
stressed that:
66. Id. at 187.
67. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
68. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Roberts Court Failed Innocence Project: Irrelevant in the High Stakes
Risk Game, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 43 (2010).
69. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
70. Hoeffel, supra note 68, at 44.
71. Id. at 43, 45, 55-57.
72. 547 U.S. at 521. Following remand, the district court "granted a conditional writ vacating the
conviction and sentence unless the State retried petitioner within 180 days," and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed that ruling. House v. Bell, 276 Fed. Appx. 437 (6th Cir. 2008).
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As a general rule, claims forfeited under state law may support federal
habeas relief only if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and
prejudice from the asserted error. The bar is not, however, unqualified.
In an effort to "balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and con-
servation of scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in jus-
tice that arises in the extraordinary case," the Court has recognized a
miscarriage-of-justice exception. "'[I]n appropriate cases,"' the Court
has said, "the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts
of cause and prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting a fun-
damentally unjust incarceration[.] "
'73
House's claim of actual innocence rested in part on DNA evidence re-
vealing that semen found on the murder victim's clothing came from her
husband and not from House. The majority found this new evidence to be
"of central importance" because the semen had been the only forensic evi-
dence linking House to the crime scene, his alleged sexual crime provided
the ostensible motive for the murder, and at the sentencing stage the jury
had found that House committed the murder during a rape or kidnapping.
74
Hoeffel does not disagree with this analysis of the facts. She objects
instead to Justice Kennedy's failure to re-define the standard for establish-
ing a post-conviction claim of innocence initially articulated in Herrera v.
Collins,75 which "assumed, without deciding, that the imprisonment of an
actually innocent person did not violate the Constitution" 76 while preserv-
ing the possibility that imposing the death penalty upon a person who had
made a "truly persuasive" post-conviction claim of actual innocence would
be unconstitutional. 77 Hoeffel argues that the emergence of DNA evidence
demands that the Roberts Court "retool Herrera and confirm the existence
of a constitutional right to prove actual innocence in light of DNA technol-
ogy. '"78 She concludes that in House the Court made matters worse by dis-
tinguishing between a "'truly extraordinary' case of innocence" that entitles
a convicted person to litigate his constitutional claims in new proceedings
and a "conclusive" case for exoneration, which establishes a claim of
"'constitutional' significance. '79 In fact, Hoeffel argues that the latter stan-
dard imposes "a practically impossible burden" that is unjustifiable in light
of the recent advances in DNA technology.
80
73. House, 547 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 540-541.
75. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
76. Hoeffel, supra note 68, at 43.
77. Id. at 44.
78. Id. at 44-45.
79. Id. at 49-50.
80. Id. at 50.
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The Court's 2009 decision in Osborne did just the opposite. Years af-
ter being convicted in Alaska state court of kidnapping and sexual assault,
Osborne asked to be permitted to perform DNA testing-at his expense-
on evidence the State had collected. Although the DNA tests Osborne
wanted to conduct could establish his guilt or innocence, the State refused
to provide him with the relevant evidence. In an opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected Osborne's claim that he due process
includes "a freestanding and far-reaching constitutional right of access to
this new type of evidence." 81 In short, even if DNA testing could exonerate
him, Osborne had no constitutional right to obtain the necessary evidence
from the State.
Osborne might have possessed a statutory right to obtain the evidence
in another state, 82 but Alaska had yet to enact legislation governing his
situation and the majority of justices agreed that the legislatures are primar-
ily responsible for determining how to utilize DNA evidence "without un-
necessarily overthrowing the established system of criminal justice. 83
Nonetheless, the Court addressed Osborne's due process claims and Hoef-
fel's sharpest criticism is leveled at this part of the opinion. She contends
that Chief Justice Roberts failed to employ "appropriate legal analysis to
resolve some questions," ignored or avoided others, construed some facts
and issues too narrowly, and invoked chimerical policy concerns. 84 This
approach can be traced to "illegitimate fears of the power of DNA to exon-
erate and to embrace a liberty interest for those who can prove their inno-
cence through DNA testing." The claim here is blunt: a majority of justices
are willing to accept wrongful convictions as a cost of maintaining our
institutions of governance.
The next two authors argue that identifiable groups are subjected to
wrongful convictions because of the processes of our institutions of justice.
Professors Podgor and Streib each argue that in our justice systems a par-
ticular group is at risk of wrongful conviction because of their positions in
our society. Standing alone, this is not a remarkable claim. We are accus-
tomed (perhaps inured) to the fact that members of certain minority groups
and poor people are more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and
punished than are Caucasians and those possessing material wealth. The
81. Dist. Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2312
(2009).
82. /d. at 2316.
83. Id.
84. Hoeffel, supra note 68, at 58-59.
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articles surprise, nonetheless, because of the groups the authors identify as
being at risk.
Podgor argues that for those charged with committing white collar
crimes, particularly high status members of organizations, "the risk of go-
ing to trial and [perhaps simply] being charged with a crime [are] so high,
that innocence and guilt no longer become the real considerations. ' 85 To
support this claim, she discusses three high profile white collar cases from
this decade. The cases and the several defendants (for example, Arthur
Andersen, LLP and Jeffrey Skilling) are sufficiently well-known that
Podgor's discussion of the facts, issues, and criminal penalties imposed on
various defendants are familiar.
Podgor's purpose in discussing these cases is to illuminate the high
level of risk facing those high profile white collar defendants who choose
to go to trial. She argues that "[i]nnocence becomes irrelevant as the real
question becomes whether it is worth the risk of testing an innocence
claim."' 86 One of her examples is James Olis, who was convicted at trial
and eventually sentenced to a prison term of six years. In contrast, his boss
and a co-worker who pled guilty to participating in the same scheme and
testified for the government against Olis received sentences of fifteen
months and one month, respectively. Podgor points out that Olis's sentence
was more than four times longer than the sentence his boss received and
seventy-two times longer than his co-worker's. 87 Organizations also can
face heightened risks by asserting innocence and contesting the govern-
ment's charges at trial. The best known example is Arthur Andersen, whose
conviction functioned as a death penalty for the firm that cost tens of thou-
sands of innocent employees their jobs.
88
Podgor's thesis that for white collar defendants--organizations and
individuals alike-the risks of going to trial are so great "that innocence
becomes insignificant in the decision-making process" and even innocent
defendants may plead guilty to avoid those risks. What may be most inter-
esting about Podgor's analysis is that she describes a potential risk facing
anyone charged with crimes, whether they are "white collar" crimes or
"street crimes." The phenomenon of individuals accepting plea bargains to
obtain sentence more favorable than those likely to be imposed after a jury
verdict of guilty is a staple of our criminal justice system. And financial
85. Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 77,77-78 (2010).
86. Id.at8l-82,84-85.
87. Id. at 81-82.
88. Id. at 85.
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considerations operate in this setting, as well. The costs of defending
against criminal charges can be ruinous unless the defendant is wealthy or
paid by the government. In other words, Podgor's critique of the reasons
that innocent white collar defendants might plead guilty is correct, but is
not unique to those defendants.
The same cannot be said about Professor Streib's thesis. He argues
that wrongful convictions of adults almost always "stem from human error
in the criminal justice system," but that children charged with crimes may
be subjected to "intentional wrongful convictions. ' 89 In some cases, these
wrongful convictions are motivated by venality, as in cases where judges
receive kickbacks in return for sentencing juveniles to private, for profit
detention centers. 90 It is more likely, however, that a wrongful conviction
of a juvenile is the product of good intentions, occurring for example "in
cases in which the judge has insufficient evidence proving any crime by the
child but feels a strong need ... to intervene.. . 'for the child's own
good."' 91 Regardless of the judge's motive, this is surely a wrongful con-
viction.
Streib reviews a number of causes of unintentional wrongful convic-
tions of adults, but it is apparent they also can occur in juvenile proceed-
ings.92 These include false confessions, eyewitness misidentification and
erroneous or false testimony by informants, ineffective assistance by de-
fense counsel, guilty pleas by innocent defendants 93-that is, the kinds of
problems discussed by other symposium authors, as well.
The idea of intentional wrongful convictions by juvenile court judges,
however, seems different not in degree, but in kind. Streib proposes that the
emerging solution in "a growing number of jurisdictions [is to] provide for
jury trials in juvenile court."' 94 Ironically, this brings us full circle, back to
the concerns expressed by other symposia authors about procedural fairness
and innocence-including, for example, concerns that juries will not fol-
low, or even understand, the court's instructions. Regardless of our best
efforts to achieve procedural justice, fallible humans and their flawed insti-
tutions will err, and innocent people will be wrongfully convicted.
89. Victor Streib, Intentional Wrongful Conviction of Children, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2010)
(emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 164.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 167.
93. Id. at 166-170.
94. Id. at 174.
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B. Remedies for Wrongful Convictions.
Professors Rosenthal and Roach address this question. Rosenthal con-
fronts the traditional remedy, money damages, and argues against the
"widespread support for expanding the damages remedies available to
those who have been wrongfully accused or convicted," a consensus
prompted at least in part by "the DNA-inspired wave of exonerations in
recent years." 95
He begins by contesting claims that strict liability is appropriate in
wrongful conviction cases, arguing that whatever its value as a device for
creating incentives in civil contexts, in the criminal justice system "a re-
gime of strict liability would operate as a kind of perverse wealth transfer"
benefitting exonerated defendants, but at the expense of the people he
deems "most in need of government assistance." Rosenthal summarizes
theories offered by Professor Levinson and other, who argue that a strict
liability regime would fail to "reduce the risk of error in criminal cases"
'96
because incentives that work in the profit maximizing private sector will
not have similar effects upon government, which instead "responds to po-
litical costs and benefits." Rosenthal applies this cost/benefit analysis with
particular vigor to prosecutors. 97 Although expressing skepticism about
elements of that argument, Rosenthal ultimately accepts its basic premises.
He also rejects arguments that society has some moral obligation to pay
compensation to those subjected to wrongful conviction, that either the
takings clause or a fault-based regime is relevant in the context of wrongful
convictions. 98
Ultimately Rosenthal concludes that solutions to the problem of
wrongful convictions will come only from jurors and voters who demand
"error-reducing reforms of prosecutorial practices," 99 and that damage
awards, whether based upon fault or strict liability, will not produce these
needed changes. If Rosenthal is correct and mechanisms other than finan-
cial compensation are the proper response to wrongful convictions, he
might well embrace the idea of innocence commissions.
Professor Roach examines the recent emergence of innocence com-
missions in several Anglo-American jurisdictions including Great Britain,
95. Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful Convictions, 85 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 127(2010).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 129, 153.
98. Id. at 136-153.
99. Id. at 161.
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Scotland, Canada, North Carolina, and California, I00 a development
spurred on by DNA exonerations of wrongfully convicted people. Not sur-
prisingly, commissions in these diverse jurisdictions have taken different
forms, have been charged with different tasks, have been granted different
powers, and have performed with varying degrees of effectiveness. Despite
this variety, Roach identifies some recurring issues arising in most jurisdic-
tions.
Roach identifies two types of innocence commission, classified ac-
cording to their functions. One type of commission is charged with discov-
ering errors in individual cases (and then typically referring those cases
back to the judicial system); the other type advocates "remedies for the
systemic causes of wrongful convictions."10' Roach argues persuasively
that although each role is "compelling," each also requires different "re-
sources and expertise."' 102 As a result, the early commissions in various
jurisdictions have found it difficult to combine the two functions. Roach
concedes that future commissions may succeed at combining the two func-
tions, 103 but suggests that it is more likely that their success will depend
upon a clearly adopting one role or the other. 104
However these institutions evolve in the coming years, their very exis-
tence reaffirms one of the essential themes emerging from this symposium.
Attempts to resolve any of the fundamental issues in our criminal justice
system inevitably implicate other ostensibly distinct issues. As the papers
that follow confirm, our constitutional rules governing the admission and
exclusion of evidence, the judicial procedures used to resolve these dis-
putes, and our presumptions about the guilt and innocence of individuals
charged with crimes are best understood as elements of what may be the
fundamental recurring question in our democracy: How do we grant to
government the power needed to maintain a decent society while preserv-
ing individual autonomy?
100. Kent Roach, The Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or
Both?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 89 (2010).
101. Id. at 91. See also id. at 107 (discussing specific recommendations for systemic changes in
Canadian police procedures; for example, recommending that all interrogations be videotaped); id. at
109 (discussing recommendations for changes in Illinois rules and practices earlier in this decade).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 112-120.
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